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Adoption, Race, and Group-Based Harm
Larry May*
The following essay is based on a presentation by Professor
Larry May on 10 March 1999 as a part of an interdisciplinary
panel discussion of Professor Dorothy Roberts’ paper.
I wish to discuss Dorothy Roberts’ powerful and original
contribution to the debates about race, adoption, and child welfare
from three different perspectives. First, as a philosopher I agree with
many things Roberts says about the nature of race and social justice.
Second, as an adoptive parent I challenge some of Roberts’ views
about adoption, especially transracial adoption. Third, as a student of
the law, I agree with the spirit but disagree with the letter of Roberts’
legal proposals. While we agree more than we disagree, I will
emphasize the points of disagreement in order to better stimulate our
collective rethinking of her controversial views and proposals.
I. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND GROUP-BASED HARM
Dorothy Roberts argues that issues of social justice need to play a
prominent role in debates about how legal institutions should deal with
the growing number of poor Black children in foster care. According
to her view it is natural to feel sympathy towards any suffering child
and to seek the end of the suffering as soon as possible.1 In attending
to the suffering of one child, however, we may neglect or even harm
many others. While it is appropriate to focus on the right of children
not to suffer at the hands of their parents or in foster care, it is also
important to focus on the harm to Black children as a group because
* Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis. Ph.D., New School for
Social Research, 1977; J.D., Washington University, expected in 2000.
1. See Dorothy Roberts, Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child Welfare Policy, 1
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y  63 (1999).
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so many of them are permanently removed from their biological
parents. In another context Roberts postulates:
The rights of Black children must be interpreted in the context
of racial oppression. . .. The excessive disruption of Black
families affects the stability of the group as a whole, weakening
its ability to struggle against many forms of institutional
discrimination. . .. As part of the group, Black children are
severely harmed. . ..2
Roberts believes a philosophically respectable position exists that
will allow us to move beyond the sympathetic response to individual
cases and enables us to consider the group consequences of various
policies. I wish to begin by strongly supporting the philosophical point
that Roberts is making. In discussions about rights and justice, there
are generally thought to be only two models. The first one is the
individualistic model of justice. Under this model if the rights of an
individual are violated, then that person will sue to obtain a remedy for
the particular harm he or she has suffered. The second model is a
collectivist one. Here rights attach to groups (e.g., whites and Blacks)
and individuals possess only derivative rights. The battles over
affirmative action and busing are largely drawn in collectivist terms
and therefore roundly criticized for neglecting the individual.
There is, however, another strategy that employs an intermediate
category of rights that I have called “group-based” rights.3 These are
rights of an individual, but rights the individual obtains has by virtue
of being a member of a group. The rights one has as a Black person or
as a parent are individual rights, but they are deeply embedded within
the social context of one’s group affiliations, which are themselves
constitutive of the individual’s identity. When a Black person is
discriminated against because she is Black, this is a denial of her
2. Dorothy Roberts, Is There Justice in Children’s Rights? The Critique of Federal Family
Preservation Policy, (Feb. 1999) (unpublished paper presented at a conference at the University of
Pennsylvania).
3. For a discussion of group-based harm see LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS:
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS (1987). See also
LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY (1992) (discussing how to conceptualize racism).
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group-based rights. Group-based rights remain a part of the
individualistic tradition because they attach to individuals. Moreover,
they also remain a part of the collectivist tradition because they are
based on group membership.
Consider the case of race-based job discrimination. If a
discriminatory hiring policy exists, then any Black person who applies
for the job will be discriminated against. In some respects it does not
matter that these job applicants have unique features; all that matters
is their membership in the group. It is, however, only an illusion to
think that a given job applicant is not harmed individually. In fact, she
is the one denied the job. Yet, the way that she is harmed is not by
virtue of her unique characteristics, but rather by virtue of her
membership in a certain group. If we treat her problem as one that is
hers personally, we will fail to see how race has played a significant
role in her discriminatory treatment. If we treat the problem as solely a
group problem, we will fail to see that individuals are indeed harmed.
So, I find myself in deep agreement with Roberts’ belief that there
is a philosophically respectable way to talk about child welfare
policies that puts race in the center of the discussion but does not
ignore the specific plight of individual children. Children in abusive or
neglectful families are harmed in ways that call out for help. However,
Black children who are removed from their biological parents and
placed into foster care and then, perhaps too quickly, into adoptive
families also experience a different kind of harm—harm as a member
of a given Black community. We must realize that laws and
government programs can harm individuals in two ways: individually
and collectively by hurting the group of which the individual is a
member. We should not let our sympathy for the plight of a given
child numb us into thinking that this suffering is the only important
consideration in these debates about child welfare.
II. THE DOUBLE-BIND FOR WHITE ADOPTIVE FAMILIES
Roberts uses her philosophical analysis to condemn a recent federal
program that moves mainly Black children, who are in foster care, into
mainly white adoptive families. In her other writings Roberts argues
that those white families who are willing to adopt Black children are
Washington University Open Scholarship
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engaging in a form of racism since they are trying to take Black
children out of their own communities and away from Black
caretakers who can instill in them a proper understanding of and
adeptness for responding to racism. In addition, she argues that those
white families who have strong preferences for adopting white children
are also engaging in a form of racism. While such arguments are not
without merit, these arguments essentially condemn adoptive white
parents for engaging in racism if they want to adopt white children or
if they want to adopt Black children.4 The upshot is that white adoptive
parents are seen as perpetuating racism regardless of their decision.
Therefore, there is an internal problem with Roberts’ position that is
especially glaring and galling for white adoptive parents like myself.
These internal problems are magnified when one realizes that
Roberts sees any adoption as a societal failure. As she states, “In an
ideal society nearly all children would be raised by their families in a
healthy, safe, and flourishing environment.”5 She claims that societies
that have reduced the number of adoptions, such as Sweden, have done
a “good thing.” Roberts takes this position because she seems to think
that biological parents can raise their own children better than
strangers. What evidence is there for this? What theory of parenting is
it based upon? We get few answers from Roberts.
Roberts merely perpetuates the stereotype of adoptive parents as
second-choice and second-rate parents, assuming that biology
somehow endows people with much better parenting skills than if they
were biologically unrelated to children they raise. According to her
view adoptive parents ideally only come into the picture when the
biological parents are dead or mentally ill.6 Adoptive parents are
seemingly better than dead or mentally ill parents, but on Roberts view
that is all we can say for sure. Roberts’ assumptions about adoption
are quite distressing indeed. What she misses is that adoption is often
the only hope that poor Black children have of breaking out of the
cycle of foster care placements.
4. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY 269-276 (1997).
5. Roberts, supra note 2, at 8.
6. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol1/iss1/8
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In her remarks on our panel, Roberts employs a strikingly
evocative example of people plucking babies out of a fast moving
stream.7 She believes it would be better if we could stop the flow, so
that so many babies would not have to be saved. However, if one
cannot stop the flow alone, Roberts views people plucking the babies
out of the stream as a bad idea. The problem is that if these babies are
not plucked out of the stream, many of them will drown. I want to
suggest that both strategies are legitimate: trying to stem the flow of
poor Black children who need to be saved by adoption and using
adoption to save those who remain in need.
Roberts misidentifies the problem. Adoptive families, especially
white families, have not caused the poverty that Roberts rightly rails
against. Transracial adoptive families are not causing the
disintegration of Black identity. Indeed, people in transracial adoptive
families and transracial marriages suffer racist abuse. So why do
white families even think about adopting Black children? In my
experience it is because they care about the children who are caught in
an often endless cycle of going between their abusive or neglectful
homes and unstable foster care arrangements. And they care about
race relations in America. There may be villains in this story but they
are not the adoptive parents.8
III. LEGAL RESPONSES TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
I will now consider whether the philosophical position Roberts and
I both endorse supports her conclusions about child welfare laws.
Roberts thinks that reproduction and adoption laws should be aimed at
promoting racial justice. Most importantly, she argues persuasively
that federal and state governments should stop penalizing and
punishing Black mothers and that these governments should not
“abandon the poor, Black, and desperate families whose children are
7. Roberts, supra note 1, at 72.
8. To be fair to Roberts I should note that the position I am really criticizing here is that
espoused by the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW). Roberts has discussed
the views of this group in supportive terms, although she has not explicitly endorsed the NABSW’s
view that when white families adopt Black children the white families engage in a “form of
genocide.” Roberts, supra note 4, at 262.
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typically put in foster care.”9 I agree with Roberts’ overall sentiment
that we need to focus on the causes of child abuse and neglect and do
something about them, rather than spend tax dollars removing Black
children from their families.
Roberts urges that we distinguish between children placed in foster
care because of abuse (sometimes even torture) and those who were
merely neglected. Abused children are only a minority of the children
in foster care, whereas the majority are victims of “parental neglect
related to poverty.” Roberts believes that removing this second group
of children from the home and into adoptive families will cause
children to “suffer when unnecessarily separated from their parents.”10
According to Roberts we should recommit to family preservation to
combat the harm done to Black children and their communities.
Additionally, she argues we should turn away from the current
program of encouraging white couples to adopt Black children and
remove them from their families.
Roberts fails to consider another group-based harm. The insecurity
of Black children, who go back and forth between abusive or
neglectful homes and unstable foster care, is also having a devastating
impact on Black community life. For this reason I have decidedly
mixed feelings about Roberts’ proposals. I completely agree that our
society should place more emphasis than it does on helping poor
families out of poverty as a means for diminishing the occurrence of
child abuse or neglect. I also believe, however, that justice is possible
in a child welfare system that encourages adoptive family placement
for those children who need to escape unsafe homes or an endless
series of foster homes. I would like to combine these two ideas. Our
laws should help and encourage the elimination of poverty and also
help well-intentioned people to adopt. Both policies should be based on
the best interests of the children.
Government agencies should not be quick to terminate parental
rights but they should not be slow to act either. Black children are
harmed by the continued disintegration of Black family life, which
9. Roberts, supra note 2, at 2.
10. Id. at 6.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol1/iss1/8
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results from the removal of children from their families. But some
Black children are harmed much more by their own biological families
and by the systemic deprivation they suffer by never having a stable,
loving home life. Black children are also harmed by the deterioration
of Black communities that results from so many Black children
remaining in unstable homes during their most formative years. For
the sake of these children, we should not be slow to remove them from
unsafe and unloving families, just as we should not be quick to remove
them permanently from families which just happen to be poor.
We should give two competing policy objectives substantial
weight. We should endorse the objective of providing the most secure
childhood possible for all children, and this means not being quick to
send children back for more abuse or neglect. Additionally, we should
endorse the objective of strengthening Black families so that they can
provide secure homes for their children, and this means not being
quick to remove them permanently from their families if it is likely
their parents will stop neglecting or abusing them. A good child
welfare program will be a reasonable one, not favoring either of these
objectives. Like other legal matters where the truth of the matter is
highly contested, a middle ground should be preferred. I have learned
much from Dorothy Roberts in that I am able to see the pitfalls of
going too far in the direction of terminating parental rights. On the
other hand, I think she has gone too far by failing to consider the
benefits of adoption. My criticisms of Dorothy Roberts, however, do
not diminish my respect for her contribution to these debates.
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